In Bangladesh, the poultry industry is an economically and socially important sector, but it is persistently threatened by the effects of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza. Thus, identifying the optimal control policy in response to an emerging disease outbreak is a key challenge for policy-makers. To inform this aim, a common approach is to carry out simulation studies comparing plausible strategies, while accounting for known capacity restrictions. In this study we perform simulations of a previously developed H5N1 influenza transmission model framework, fitted to two separate historical outbreaks, to assess specific control objectives related to the burden or duration of H5N1 outbreaks among poultry farms in the Dhaka division of Bangladesh. In particular, we explore the optimal implementation of ring culling, ring vaccination and active surveillance measures when presuming disease transmission predominately occurs from premises-to-premises, versus a setting requiring the inclusion of external factors. Additionally, we determine the sensitivity of the management actions under consideration to differing 1 levels of capacity constraints and outbreaks with disparate transmission dynamics. While we find that reactive culling and vaccination policies should pay close attention to these factors to ensure intervention targeting is optimised, across multiple settings the top performing control action amongst those under consideration were targeted proactive surveillance schemes. Our findings may advise the type of control measure, plus its intensity, that could helpfully be applied in the event of a re-emergent outbreak of H5N1 amongst poultry in the Dhaka division of Bangladesh.
Influenza is a respiratory infection of mammals and birds caused by an RNA virus in the family 2 of Orthomyxoviridae [1] . There are four types of influenza viruses: A, B, C and D. Of these 3 four types, the zoonotic capability of influenza A viruses makes them the most significant in an 4 epidemiological and public health context, being associated with most of the widespread seasonal 5 influenza epidemics and the type of influenza capable of causing occasional global pandemics. 6 While the natural hosts of influenza A viruses are aquatic bird species, these viruses occasionally 7 spillover into other animal hosts, including domestic poultry, pigs, horses, a variety of carnivores 8 and marine mammals [2] . Sporadically, the viruses adapt to their new animal hosts, leading to 9 enzootic virus circulation for sustained periods. However, apart from a few cases of reputed direct 10 zoonotic transmission of influenza A viruses to humans from wild birds, due to close contact 11 and de-feathering activities [3, 4] , humans have been primarily infected with zoonotic influenza 12 viruses via intermediate species to which human exposure is more frequent. Domestic livestock 13 such as pigs and poultry have a key role in this regard. Influenza A is therefore not considered 14 an eradicable disease, rather prevention and control are the only realistic goals [5] . 15 The prevention and control of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in poultry is of 16 paramount importance, with HPAI viruses causing severe disease in domestic poultry with a 17 high death rate [6] . The specific intervention actions to be taken with regards to regulating live 18 bird markets (LBMs), imposing movement restrictions or quarantine measures, and culling and 19 vaccinating can vary according to local circumstances and from country to country. A single 20 solution for all situations is unattainable, and a balance must be established among effective, 21 feasible and socially acceptable control measures that safeguard the short-term and long-term 22 livelihoods of farmers and the health of the population. 23 In general, however, a number of basic measures are common to all circumstances. One such 24 measure is that infected birds and those in contact with them must be humanely and safely 25 culled to halt spread of the disease. Humane culling limits spread of disease by decreasing 26 the amount of virus shed from any one site. However, culling alone usually cannot completely 27 prevent further spread because some virus will have been released before culling commences, 28 and often before the disease is detected. As a result, pre-emptive culling (the culling of animals 29 before they are found to be infected) can be used to attempt to make this a more proactive 30 measure. Use of widespread pre-emptive culling based on defined areas around an outbreak has 31 been a standard implementation of this protocol [7] . 32 Disease control programs may also aim to create impediments to spread. An essential part 33 of creating impediments is to establish an environment in which there are relatively few loca- 34 tions that could become easily infected, with vaccination one of the main methods available for 35 achieving such a goal [7] . Vaccination against HPAI aims to prevent clinical disease as well as 36 to reduce levels of virus shed into the environment and stop infection spreading. In parts of 37 Asia, vaccination programs have been implemented and encouraged as part of a control pro-38 gram in poultry. Vietnam is a notable case, with it being found that within-flock reproductive 39 numbers -i.e. the expected number of secondary cases from an average primary case in an en- 40 tirely susceptible population -for premises reporting H5N1 infection were lower in an outbreak 41 period using both depopulation and nationwide systematic vaccination campaigns, compared 42 to an outbreak period employing depopulation control measures alone [8] . Recent positive de- 43 velopments have seen vaccines against H5N1 and H7N9 prevent birds from shedding the virus 44 through their mouths and droppings, thus stopping transmission from one bird to another [9] . 45 Of particular importance is ensuring the vaccines used have high efficacy. In Bangladesh, vac-46 cines against HPAI have been available since 2012 for use on commercial layer and breeder farms 47 (M.G. Osmani and M.A. Kalam, personal communication). However, a recent H5N1 surveillance 48 study found no significant difference in anti-H5 seropositivity between vaccinated and unvacci-49 nated chickens, indicating a failure of the vaccination program and a need for updated poultry 50 vaccines [10] . 51 Policy effectiveness will depend critically on how swiftly clinical cases are diagnosed and the speed 52 with which the chosen control measure can be administered. By employing active surveillance 53 of premises (i.e. activities that are frequent, intensive and aim at establishing the presence or 54 absence of a specific disease), the time for identifying cases and notifying officials of an infected 55 flock may be reduced. 56 Although active surveillance activities can be expensive and time-consuming, there are notable 57 examples of the benefits of strengthening influenza surveillance programs. Intensification of 58 surveillance has helped control and limit the spread of HPAI viruses among poultry on a na-59 tional scale (e.g. Nigeria [11] ), while early detection of HPAI H5N1 viruses through enhanced 60 surveillance in wild birds and domestic poultry has been a key measure to ensure rapid dis-61 ease control on a continental scale in the case of the European Union [12] . Improved influenza 62 virus surveillance in pigs revealed that influenza virus transmission from humans to swine is far 63 more frequent than swine-to-human zoonosis [13] . The public availability of genetic sequence 64 data from databases such as GenBank has allowed pioneering studies to come into fruition, set-65 ting out to characterise the cross-species nature and the migration of influenza A viruses on a 66 global scale [14] . In addition, there are probable long-term advantages to be gained from active 67 surveillance which outweigh the costs. These advantages include trade benefits, with eventual 68 proof of disease absence allowing the opening-up of hitherto untapped markets. Further, for 69 diseases such as rinderpest, beginning active surveillance meant vaccination could cease, sav-70 ing sizeable amounts of money that otherwise would have been spent on blanket vaccination 71 campaigns [15] .
72
In conjunction with this collection of possible actions, distinct stakeholders may have disparate 73 control objectives. As a consequence, stakeholders may have different metrics of management 74 success that they are most interested in optimising. Crucially, alternative objectives may require 75 differing approaches to ensure outcomes are optimal [16, 17] . These objectives may only depend 76 upon a single, measurable outbreak burden quantity, such as duration. On the other hand, 77 objectives may be linked to multiple outbreak quantities and be treated in monetary terms, as 78 has been utilised previously in the context of other livestock diseases such as foot-and-mouth 79 disease [17, 18] . Throughout this paper, we concentrate on the former category of objectives, 80 namely through the following outbreak burden facets: duration, size (in the form of total number 81 of premises infected during the course of the outbreak), cumulative number of poultry culled and 82 spatial extent. Whilst a rigorous cost analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the application 83 (to this setting) of objective functions that are treated in monetary terms is an avenue for future 84 work.
85
Our focus in this study is assessing the capability of various intervention approaches in mitigating 86 the impact of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks within the poultry industry in Bangladesh. In addition 87 to being a country that has suffered from recurrent H5N1 outbreaks in poultry as recently as 88 2012 [19] , Bangladesh is a prime candidate for being the source of newly emerging influenza 89 strains with pandemic-causing potential. The reasons for this are twofold: first, Bangladesh is 90 one of the most densely populated countries in the world [20] ; second, Bangladesh already has 91 a substantial poultry population (1194 birds/km 2 ) and the poultry industry is going through 92 a period of rapid intensification [21] . These factors are underlined by the recent emergence of 93 a new genotype of HPAI H5N1 viruses in the country that are now dominant and represent 94 the current threat to domestic poultry and humans in the region [22] . Therefore, it is vital 95 to assess the impact of interventions intending to curb the burden and/or duration of future 96 outbreaks.
97
The key platforms of current HPAI control programs in Bangladesh are focused on case detection, 98 identification of premises deemed to be in direct contact with a premises reporting infection, 99 and subsequent stamping out of flocks with reported infection [23] . Bangladesh has however 100 utilised, or has the potential to implement, each of the intervention types described above. 101 Historically, Bangladesh adopted a ring culling approach to combat HPAI outbreaks. Prior to 102 2008, poultry flocks within 1km of premises with confirmed HPAI infection were designated to be 103 culled (M.A. Kalam, personal communication). Furthermore, with vaccines against HPAI now 104 being available (since 2012) for use on commercial layer and breeder farms, ring vaccination has 105 become an implementable control management action. In terms of active surveillance, from 2008 106 to 2012 a small-scale active surveillance system was run. This comprised of teams of community 107 health workers across the country, each monitoring specified farms and reporting to livestock 108 officers mortality events and the presence of any clinical signs of disease (M.G. Osmani and M.A. 109 Kalam, personal communication). Thus, for Bangladesh ring culling, ring vaccination and active 110 surveillance are representative of HPAI control policies that have been implemented historically, 111 are currently in use or that could be pursued in the future.
112
In this paper, we evaluate the above assortment of intervention styles in opposing outbreaks 113 of HPAI H5N1 within the Dhaka division, Bangladesh. We also explore the potential impact 114 these measures could have if capacities for enacting control increase over the current capac-115 ity. Assessments were conducted with respect to optimising particular control objectives that 116 were dependent upon measurable outbreak burden quantities (such as outbreak size and dura-117 tion). This analysis was done via simulations of our H5N1 influenza transmission model that 118 has previously been fitted to outbreak data in the Dhaka division [24] , allowing the optimisation 119 of decision making under uncertainty in a principled way. Specifically, we aimed to ascertain 120 both the required intensity of culling and vaccination measures, and type of active surveillance 121 scheme, to optimise a given control objective. Our three primary focuses were then as fol-122 lows: (i) analyse variability in these choices if in a setting where transmission is believed to 123 be predominately from premises-to-premises, versus the scenario where importations and other 124 external environmental/ecological factors are also considered; (ii) inform decisions regarding in-125 tervention prioritisation and implementation when under resource constraints that limit control 126 capacity; (iii) determine the sensitivity of the choice of management action to epidemiological 127 characteristics, by considering outbreaks with disparate transmission dynamics. 
Methods

129
The data 130 Throughout 2010, the Bangladesh office of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 131 Nations (FAO/UN) undertook a census of all commercial poultry premises, listing 65,451 premises 132 in total, of which 2,187 were LBMs. Each premises was visited once, recording location and the 133 the number of avian livestock present during the visit within these categories: layer chickens, 134 broiler chickens, ducks, others (e.g. turkeys, quails). Within the census data there were instances 135 of multiple premises having the same location (i.e. identical latitude and longitude co-ordinates). 136 For these occurrences the avian livestock populations were amalgamated, giving a single popu-137 lation for each category at each location.
138
Of the non-market locations, 23,412 premises had blank entries for all avian types. Blank 139 entries corresponded to no poultry being present when the census visit occurred, due to the 140 premises either being between poultry stocks or being temporarily closed by the farmer due 141 to an ownership transfer taking place, rather than data entry errors (M.G. Osmani, personal 142 communication). We made a simplifying assumption that at any given time an equivalent 143 proportion of premises would not have any avian livestock at the premises. Therefore, we did 144 not make use of these locations in our analysis. While not discussed here, the sensitivity of 145 model outputs to this assumption requires further consideration.
146
Owing to the small number of premises in the Dhaka division recorded as having ducks or 147 other poultry types present (around 20), our model simulations comprised purely those premises 148 recorded as having layer and/or broiler chicken flocks present. This totalled 13,330 premises.
149
Between 2007 and 2012, there were six epidemic waves of H5N1 among poultry in Bangladesh, 150 resulting in a total of 554 premises with confirmed infection and over 2,500,000 birds being 151 destroyed. In previous work [24] , we developed a suite of nested models for the Dhaka division 152 that were fitted to the two largest epidemic waves, wave 2 (September 2007 to May 2008) and 153 wave 5 (January 2011 to May 2011), resulting in a total of 232 and 161 premises becoming 154 infected, respectively (see Supporting Information for further epidemiological data details). In 155 cases where there were discrepancies between flock size from the poultry case dataset and the 156 2010 census, we defaulted to the poultry case dataset.
157
Mathematical model for H5N1 transmission 158 In this paper, we utilise a previously developed model framework [24] and investigate the impact 159 of a range of control and surveillance strategies on different control objectives when there is 160 uncertainty about epidemic dynamics and resource capacity. The model is a discrete-time com-161 partmental model, where the individual poultry premises is the epidemiological unit of interest. 162 Consequently, layer and broiler flock sizes at each premises were combined to give an overall 163 poultry population. At any given point in time a premises i could be in one of four states, S, I, 164 Rep or C: i ∈ S implies premises i was susceptible to the disease; i ∈ I implies premises i was 165 infectious and not yet reported; i ∈ Rep implies premises i was still infectious, but had been 166 reported; i ∈ C implies that premises i had been culled. In other words, all poultry types within 167 a premises become rapidly infected such that the entire premises can be classified as Susceptible 168 (S), Infected (I), Reported (Rep) or Culled (C).
169
The reporting delay, time taken for a premises to transition from state I to Rep, accounts for a 170 premises being infectious before clinical signs of H5N1 infection are observed, which may not be 171 immediate [25] , followed by the time taken for premises owners to notify the relevant authori-172 ties [23] . While the poultry epidemic was ongoing we assumed a premises was not repopulated 173 once culled.
174
The force of infection against a susceptible premises i on day t was comprised of two terms: (i) 175 the force of infection generated by an infectious premises j (η ij ), (ii) a 'spark' term ( i ) to allow 176 for spontaneous, non-distance dependent infections that were unexplained by the susceptibility, 177 transmissibility and kernel components of the model [26] . This captures factors such as importa-178 tions from outside the study region and transmission from virus-contaminated environments (i.e. 179 fomites). Further, despite backyard poultry not being explicitly included within these models 180 its contribution to the force of infection could be incorporated into i .
181
As a result, the total force of infection has the following general form:
We assume a seven day delay from infection to reporting (unless specified otherwise), in line 183 with the results of previous work [24, 27] . The contribution by infected premises j to the force 184 of infection against a susceptible premises i satisfies
N c,i is the total number of chickens recorded as being on premises i, t c measures the individual 186 chicken transmissibility, d ij is the distance between premises i and j in kilometres, and K is the 187 transmission kernel to capture how the relative likelihood of infection varies with distance. The 188 model also incorporated power law exponents on the susceptible population, p c , and infected 189 population, q c . These power law exponents allow for a non-linear increase in susceptibility and 190 transmissibility with farm size, which have previously been shown to provide a more accurate 191 prediction of farm-level epidemic dynamics [28] .
192
The transmission kernel K in our model is Pareto distributed such that:
where x min is the minimum possible value of the function (set to 0.1, corresponding to 100 194 metres, with all between location distances less than 100 metres taking the 100 metre kernel 195 value) and α ≥ −1. Values of α close to −1 give a relatively constant kernel over all distances, 196 with α = −1 corresponding to transmission risk being independent of distance. As α increases 197 away from −1 localised transmission is favoured, with long-range transmission diminished.
198
The spark term was the same fixed value for every premises, , with the total rate of infection 199 against a susceptible premises i on day t satisfying Rate
The previous model fitting study found the wave 5 division-level model, compared to the wave 201 2 fitted model, had a stronger preference for short-range transmission, with the flock size of 202 infectious premises also having a more prominent role in the force of infection [24] . This allowed 203 us to explore the sensitivity of the management actions under consideration to epidemics with 204 disparate transmission dynamics. Complete listings of the inferred parameter distributions for 205 both models are provided in Table S2 . 206 Poultry control policies of interest 207
In the event of outbreaks of H5N1, a range of policies may be implemented to reduce the risk of 208 further spread of disease. Here we investigate the relative effect of the implementation of three 209 poultry-targeted policy actions: ring culling, ring vaccination and active surveillance. There 210 are often restrictions on the resources available for enforcing such interventions, limiting the 211 number of poultry and/or premises that can be targeted on any given day. As a consequence, 212 we imposed daily capacities on the maximum number of poultry and the maximum number of 213 premises targeted by each control action, with three differing levels of severity related to the 214 availability of resources. 215 We investigate here resource constraints that are representative of current capacities to enact 216 control measures in Bangladesh, but in addition explore the potential impact of interventions 217 should capacities be larger than are currently the case in the country. By examining a range 218 of constraints, we could establish if the action determined optimal was sensitive to the daily 219 capacity to carry out control. Resource limits exceeding the upper capacity levels considered 220 here were not investigated due to requiring a longer-term build up of government resources to 221 be attainable (M.G. Osmani, personal communication).
222
In each case a baseline control measure of only culling reported premises was performed, with 223 premises being culled on the same day they were reported if possible (with respect to the resource 224 constraints in place). Note that culling of premises reporting infection was carried out in all 225 subsequent control strategies outlined below.
226
Ring culling
227
For this choice of action, in addition to the culling of premises reporting infection, all premises 228 within a specified distance of locations with confirmed infection were marked for culling. The 229 distances evaluated here ranged from 1-10km (in 1km increments). In order to simulate the 230 effect of differing resource constraints within the Dhaka division, we imposed three conditions, 231 based upon low, medium and high culling capacities (see Table 1 for a listing of utilised capacity 232 values).
233
To clarify, premises reporting infection were prioritised above all others for culling, ordered by 234 the date of reporting. For those premises designated for ring culling that were not infected, the 235 order of priority was determined using a distance-based approach, with resources allocated from 236 the outer edge and moving inwards to the centre (an 'outside-to-centre' approach). In other 237 words, following the determination of premises situated within the ring established around a 238 premises reporting infection, distances between all such premises and the infected premises were 239 computed with the premises then culled in descending distance order. Note that all premises 240 in the ring established around the initially reported infected premises had to be treated before 241 moving on to locations that were contained within rings established around the next set of 242 subsequently reported infected premises. 243 7
Ring vaccination 244
For this choice of action, all premises within a specified distance of any premises reporting in-245 fection were listed for vaccination. As with ring culling, the ring radii evaluated ranged from 246 1-10km (in 1km increments). In light of previous research highlighting apparent discrepancies 247 between the vaccine strain and the viruses in circulation in Bangladesh [10] we did not assume 248 perfect vaccine efficacy, but instead set efficacy to 70% (unless specified otherwise). While this 249 efficacy is not guaranteed to fully agree with the true efficacy of currently administered vaccines, 250 it considers a general situation where the proposed vaccine possesses a reasonable capability to 251 suppress the circulating strain. We assumed a baseline effectiveness delay value of seven days to 252 account for the time required for suitable immune protection to develop after the vaccine was ad-253 ministered (M.G. Osmani and M.A. Kalam, personal communication). With the epidemiological 254 unit of interest being the individual poultry premises, we assumed for successfully vaccinated 255 flocks (i.e. vaccinated premises that did not become infected during the post-vaccination effec-256 tiveness delay period) that, given a 70% vaccine efficacy, 30% of the flock remained susceptible 257 to infection (and as a consequence able to transmit infection).
258
As the vaccination strategies considered here also involved the culling of reported premises, 259 we had to make an assumption regarding how these two aspects should be factored into the 260 resource limits. We were informed that while culling would be carried out by DLS (Department 261 of Livestock Services) staff, vaccines would be administered by the farms themselves under the 262 supervision of DLS staff (M.A. Kalam, personal communication). Therefore, we treated these 263 activities as being independent of each other, assigning separate resource limitations to each 264 control action. As for ring culling, low, medium and high capacity settings were investigated 265 (Table 1 ).
266
There was no limit on the cumulative number of vaccine doses available. An outside-to-centre 267 resource allocation prioritisation approach was used for vaccination, matching the ring culling 268 prioritisation procedure.
269
Active Surveillance
270
The active surveillance actions of interest here concentrated on the earlier detection of clinical 271 signs of disease within poultry flocks. In model simulations of these initiatives, premises under-272 going active surveillance had their notification delay reduced from seven to two days. A two day 273 delay was chosen, and not a larger reduction to a single day or the complete removal of the report-274 ing delay, to align with the shortest delay in detecting clinical signs that is realistically attainable 275 under ideal conditions. Such a presumption has been made in prior studies [29] , and accounts 276 for the fact that a flock can be infectious before clinical signs of H5N1 infection are observed, 277 which may not be immediate even when active surveillance procedures are in place [25] . Note 278 that there were no other control actions in place beyond this and the culling of flocks at premises 279 reporting infection (which abided by the previously discussed capacity limitations).
280
Four active surveillance strategies were compared based on two distinct types of implementa-281 tion. The first two surveillance strategies we consider are reactive in nature. In reactive schemes, 282 holdings undergo active surveillance if within a given distance of premises reporting infection. 283 We imposed a limit on the number of premises that could be treated in this way. Thus, when 284 resource thresholds were exceeded, only those premises deemed to be of higher priority under-285 went active surveillance, with the following two prioritisation strategies studied: (i) 'reactive by 286 distance', with premises ordered by distance to the focal premises, nearest first (i.e. inside-to-out 287 approach); (ii) 'reactive by population', with premises ordered in descending flock size order. 288 For these schemes the ring size for active surveillance was set at 500m.
289
The next two surveillance strategies under consideration are proactive approaches, with a spec-290 ified proportion of premises within the Dhaka division selected by some designated criteria to 291 undergo constant active surveillance. The two criteria evaluated here were: (i) 'proactive by 292 population', by ranking all premises in descending flock size order, (ii) 'proactive by premises 293 density', by ranking all premises in descending order of premises density within 500m.
294
For both kinds of active surveillance (reactive and proactive approaches), we again considered 295 three capacity settings (low, medium, high), with the specific limits stated in Table 1 .
296
Simulation outline
297
The simulation procedure employed here used the Sellke construction [30] . A desirable character-298 istic of this framework is that the inherent randomness of an epidemic realisation can be encoded 299 at the beginning of the simulation with a random vector Z of Exp (1) For this series of simulations we were interested in elucidating the intensity of control actions 306 necessary to minimise epidemic severity based on the district of outbreak origin, and how this 307 differed between the two fitted models with their contrasting premises-to-premises transmission 308 dynamics. To be able to ascertain the true impact of outbreak origin on the epidemic outcomes 309 of interest we assumed premises infection was predominately driven by premises-to-premises 310 transmission, with no infection of premises arising due to external factors. As a consequence, 311 the background spark term was set to zero in all runs, while in each run an initial cluster of 312 three infected premises was seeded in one of the 18 districts situated within the division (see 313 Fig. 1 ).
314
For each culling, vaccination, and active surveillance management action, we performed 1,000 315 simulation runs with the wave 2 fitted transmission model and between 500 to 1,000 simulation 316 runs with the wave 5 fitted transmission model. A consistent set of distinct sampled parameter 317 values (obtained previously via MCMC) and initial seed infection locations were used across 318 these runs to aid intervention comparisons. The particular control objectives of interest here 319 were focused on either reducing the expected length of an outbreak, or minimising the likelihood 320 of an outbreak becoming widespread. To this end, the summary outputs analysed for this 321 scenario were as follows: (i) mean outbreak duration, (ii) probability of an epidemic (where we 322 subjectively define an outbreak as an epidemic if there are infected premises in five or more 323 districts, with the total number of infected premises exceeding 15).
324
Choice of control policy in presence of external factors 325 Our second scenario of interest was to determine the optimal control strategy when an outbreak 326 is ongoing and infection may arise anywhere within the division, in addition to premises-to-327 premises transmission dynamics. These simulations incorporated the background spark term , 328 with a single initial infected premises placed anywhere in the division. 329 We stipulated a simulated outbreak to be complete once a specified number of consecutive 330 infection-free days had occurred. For the wave 2 fitted model, a value of 28 days gave a simulated 331 median epidemic length (using infected premises culling only, with reporting to culling times 332 weighted by the empirical probability mass function) that corresponded well with the data 333 ( Fig. 2(a) ). On the other hand, a 14 day period with no premises becoming infected was more 334 suitable for the wave 5 fitted model ( Fig. 2(b) ), with runs using the 28 day infection-free condition 335 giving, in general, longer outbreak periods than the observed data ( Fig. 2(c) ). As a consequence, 336 the infection-free condition values were set to 28 days and 14 days for runs with the wave 2 and 337 5 fitted models respectively.
338
For each poultry-targeted management action, we performed 1,000 simulation runs with the 339 wave 2 fitted transmission model and 500 simulation runs with the wave 5 fitted transmission 340 model. To aid intervention comparisons across the runs, we again used a consistent set of 341 sampled parameter values and initial seed infection locations. The control objectives of interest 342 in this scenario were again focused on outbreak length and size, in particular either increasing 343 the chance of an outbreak being short, maximising the likelihood of an outbreak remaining 344 below a specified size, or minimising the number of poultry destroyed as a result of culling. 345 The particular summary statistics that we therefore chose for these control objectives were 346 as follows: (i) outbreak duration t being 90 days or less, (ii) outbreak size I not exceeding 25 347 infected premises, (iii) mean number of poultry culled. In these instances, a univariate sensitivity 348 analysis was also performed on two vaccination-specific variables, namely vaccine efficacy and 349 effectiveness delay, encompassing ranges of 50-90% for vaccine efficacy and 4-14 days for the 350 effectiveness delay respectively.
351
Results
352
Choice of control policy based on outbreak origin 353 Here we consider management of outbreaks whose sole viable route of transmission is premises-354 to-premises. We establish the severity of control or type of surveillance policy that could be 355 implemented to minimise epidemic duration or probability of a widespread outbreak, dependent 356 upon the district of outbreak origin and capacity constraints.
357
Culling and vaccination 358 In the event of outbreaks with wave 2 type transmission dynamics, regardless of the district 359 of introduction, for minimising the epidemic probability we observe that the optimal ring cull 360 radius increases under less restrictive capacity constraints ( Fig. 3(a) ). If capacities are low, then 361 1km-3km radius ring culling was found to be optimal for most districts (Fig. 3(a) , left panel). 362 As capacities increase, we observe a slight increase in the optimum radius, with 8-10km ring 363 culling optimal for outbreaks occurring in some districts ( Fig. 3(a) , right panel).
364
A similar effect was observed when considering vaccination as a control strategy ( Fig. 3(b) ). 365 However, for some districts, in conjunction with low and mid-level vaccination capacities, vacci-366 nation was not found to decrease the probability of epidemic take off, with solely culling those 367 premises reporting infection the preferred strategy ( Fig. 3(b) , left and middle panels). Opti-368 mal vaccination radii for each capacity level were found to be larger than optimal ring culling 369 radii, possibly owing to a delay in onset of immunity. Qualitatively similar outcomes were ob-370 served across the tested transmission models and capacity constraints when the objective was 371 to minimise expected outbreak duration (Figs. S2 and S3).
372
When analysing the impact of control policies to minimise epidemic risk for outbreaks with 373 wave 5 transmission dynamics, we observe a different effect. In this case, optimal ring culling 374 radii were higher than optimal vaccination radii for many districts, even when capacities to 375 implement control were high (Fig. 4) . In low capacity circumstances the epidemic source made 376 scant difference to the chosen ring culling size, typically 1km ( Fig. 4(a) , left panel). This did 377 not hold under a high resource capacity. Outbreaks emerging in central and northern districts 378 typically required upper radius values of 7km or 8km, while the western district of Rajbari 379 (east) required the 10km upper limit of the range of values explored here. In the event of an 380 outbreak beginning in one of the remaining districts, only localised ring culling of 1km or 2km 381 was suggested, though we observed a ring cull of some form was always found to be preferred 382 over merely culling infected premises ( Fig. 4(a) , right panel).
383
On the other hand, regardless of capacity constraints, for outbreaks beginning in northern 384 and southern districts ring vaccination did not provide improved impact over solely culling 385 infected premises, while central districts typically only required a coverage radius of 5km or less 386 ( Fig. 4(b) ).
387
As a cautionary note, sensitivity analysis of the variations in the control objective metrics against 388 intervention severity (for outbreaks beginning in a given district) revealed these variations to be 389 small, especially under vaccination measures (Figs. S4 to S7).
390
Active surveillance 391 We now investigate the extent to which H5N1 outbreak burden in the Dhaka division of Bangladesh 392 may be reduced through active surveillance. As described above, we consider implementation 393 of both proactive and reactive surveillance strategies. Our model indicates that, regardless of 394 outbreak wave and location of outbreak, proactive surveillance schemes were optimal across all 395 capacity scenarios and control objectives. Additionally, independent of the source district for 396 the outbreak, higher capacity thresholds usually led to greater reductions in outbreak length 397 and size relative to the scenario where no active surveillance scheme was utilised ( Fig. 5 and 398 Fig. S8 ).
399
For wave 2 transmission dynamics, the 'proactive by population' surveillance strategy was found 400 to be optimal for all capacities and districts, with the exception of the district of Narshingdi 401 where the capacity for active surveillance implementation is high. In this instance, if we are 402 interested in minimising outbreak duration, 'proactive by premises density' surveillance could be 403 implemented, whilst 'proactive by population' surveillance could be used if we wish to minimise 404 the likelihood of an epidemic ( Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) , right panels). Similar outcomes were 405 obtained for outbreaks with wave 5 type transmission dynamics where, irrespective of the district 406 where the outbreak originated, the 'proactive by population' strategy was always selected as the 407 optimal action (Fig. S8 ).
408
For each combination of transmission model, capacity-level and control objective, we compared 410 the top performing strategy within each intervention type (ring culling, ring vaccination, active 411 surveillance) relative to culling infected premises alone. In all circumstances, the best performing 412 active surveillance scheme was deemed to be the preferred approach in optimising the control 413 objectives of interest (Tables S3 to S6) . 414 Particularly noteworthy are the stark reductions (between 65% to 99%) in the probabilities of 415 an epidemic occurring under wave 2 type transmission dynamics when utilising a 'proactive 416 by population' active surveillance scheme versus solely culling infected premises. On the other 417 hand, the attained reductions in the expected outbreak duration were generally between 20-50%, 418 thus less prominent ( Fig. 5 and Tables S3 and S4 ). Under wave 5 type transmission dynamics, 419 reductions in the measures for assessing both epidemic duration and epidemic probability control 420 objectives lay in the range of 30-85% ( Fig. S8 and Tables S5 and S6 ).
421
Choice of control policy in presence of external factors 422
In this section, we consider the impact of control in the Dhaka division in the event of external 423 introductions of disease from the surrounding divisions. In this instance, we determine the 424 control or surveillance policy that could usefully be implemented across all districts in the division 425 to minimise the epidemic duration, outbreak size or the number of poultry culled.
426
Culling and vaccination 427
For control objectives targeting outbreak length and magnitude, we ascertained that ring culling 428 typically outperformed ring vaccination, with qualitatively similar outcomes acquired for our two 429 distinct transmission models (Figs. 6 and S9). We found that even when vaccination capacity 430 was high, ring culling resulted in a lower likelihood of long duration outbreaks and fewer premises 431 becoming infected.
432
For ring culling there was evidence of a performance hierarchy across the three tested capacity 433 constraints Figs. 6(a) and 6(c). For any given ring size, a high capacity allowance generally out-434 performed a medium capacity allowance, which in turn outperformed a low capacity allowance. 435 Further, under high control capacity resource availability, each incremental increase in the ra-436 dius size generally led to modest improvements in the summary output of interest (at least up 437 to the 10km upper limit in place here). In contrast, for low and medium capacity thresholds, 438 the optimal radius size varied dependent upon the objective of interest. Such a relationship 439 was less apparent for vaccination. For the epidemic duration control metric, irrespective of 440 the transmission dynamics, we identified little variation in this measure among the three ca-441 pacity constraints across all tested ring sizes and also relative to only culling infected premises 442 Figs. 6(b) and 6(d). Comparable outcomes were found when optimising the epidemic size ob-443 jective of I ≤ 25 (Fig. S9) . These measures were insensitive to a range of vaccine efficacies and 444 vaccine effectiveness delay times (Figs. S10 and S11).
445
However, if our objective was to minimise the total number of poultry culled, we found that 446 vaccination was, unsurprisingly, preferred over ring culling in all instances (Fig. 7) . Incremental 447 increases in vaccination radius size under each set of control capacity conditions were found to 448 cause modest improvements with regard to this objective. Specifically, a 9km or 10km ring was 449 optimal across all capacities and both transmission models. On the other hand, if conditions 450 preclude the use of vaccination, pursuing a ring culling strategy in combination with this control 451 objective results in the best performing action being either no culling beyond infected premises 452 or a ring cull of 1km ( Fig. 7) . Under wave 2 type transmission dynamics, high capacity ring 453 culling results in the largest number of poultry culled, particularly when implemented at large 454 radii ( Fig. 7(a) ). For wave 5 transmission dynamics the opposite effect is seen ( Fig. 7(c) ). The 455 larger expected size of outbreaks in these circumstances means that low capacity ring culling 456 proves insufficient to control the outbreak, resulting in a much larger number of poultry being 457 culled than for higher capacities. For either wave 2 and wave 5 type transmission, increasing 458 vaccine efficacy or decreasing the vaccine effectiveness delay led to modest reductions in the 459 expected number of poultry culled per outbreak (Figs. S10 and S11).
460
Active surveillance 461 Investigating the effectiveness of active surveillance against H5N1 HPAI under this transmission 462 setting, a collection of common trends were obtained across the three control objectives (outbreak 463 duration being 90 days or less, outbreak size not exceeding 25 premises, minimising mean number 464 of poultry culled) and two disease transmission models analysed.
465
Irrespective of the objective being scrutinised, the most effective active surveillance policy was 466 the 'proactive by population' scheme, with this conclusion being consistent under either wave 2 467 or wave 5 type transmission dynamics (Figs. 8(a) to 8(c)). Additionally, increased availability 468 of resources for control raised the performance of this kind of action. This is typified when 469 examining the outbreak duration objective of t ≤ 90. Under the wave 2 transmission model this 470 rose from 0.55 (low capacity) to 0.61 (high capacity), whereas with no active surveillance in use 471 the probability was only 0.51. Such effects were even more stark for the wave 5 transmission 472 model, with outbreaks being more likely to spread rapidly and have enhanced longevity under 473 these dynamics. With an initial value of 0.38 when no active surveillance was used, this rose to 474 0.46 for low capacity levels, reaching 0.58 under high capacity conditions. Thus, use of the wave 475 5 transmission model led to an approximate 50% improvement over having no control.
476
Although the 'proactive by premises density' strategy offers notable improvements under less 477 stringent capacity constraints, it was not as effective as the population-based targeting measure. 478 This is exemplified by the discrepancy between the two typically growing with enlarged capacity 479 thresholds. For example, the difference grew from 0.02 (at low capacity) to 0.04 (at high capacity) 480 for t ≤ 90 using the wave 2 transmission model, and from 0.07 (at low capacity) to 0.11 (at high 481 capacity) for I ≤ 25 using the wave 5 transmission model. A further drawback of the 'proactive 482 by premises density' strategy was that under low control capacity levels it struggled to beat 483 either reactive surveillance policy (Fig. 8) .
484
Comparing the two reactive strategies we found their performance differential to be minor. 485 Despite offering marginal benefits over having no active surveillance policy in use, they did 486 not bring about noticeable improvements towards the desired goal under more relaxed capacity 487 constraints (Fig. 8) . The observation of 'proactive by population' outperforming 'proactive by 488 premises density', and the two reactive strategies only being a slight improvement compared to 489 having no active surveillance, is also evident when comparing the complete premises outbreak size 490 distributions (Fig. S12) . For a full listing of values related to the features raised see Tables S11 491 to S13.
In a similar manner to when we previously compared intervention types when optimising control 494 policy based on outbreak origin, we again examine the top performing strategy within each 495 intervention type (ring culling, ring vaccination, active surveillance) relative to culling infected 496 premises alone. Once more, this illuminated the superior performance of ring culling to ring 497 vaccination when aiming to optimise the outbreak size and duration control objectives considered 498 here, and vice versa if optimising the poultry culled control objective (Fig. 9 ).
499
Active surveillance, in the form of the 'proactive by population' scheme, was dominant in the 500 majority of scenarios over the entire range of ring cull and vaccination severities. The exception 501 to this was under wave 2 transmission dynamics when wanting to minimise the probability of 502 the outbreak size exceeding 25 premises, in tandem with there being less constraints on control 503 capacity. Specifically, under medium and high capacity conditions a 9km ring cull was predicted 504 to give the greatest gains relative to only culling infected premises ( Fig. 9) .
505
Discussion 506
This study explores the predicted impact of a variety of intervention methods, namely culling, 507 vaccination and active surveillance, for mitigating the impact of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks among 508 poultry within the Dhaka division of Bangladesh. Informed via a mathematical and compu-509 tational approach, it emphasises how knowledge of both disease transmission dynamics and 510 potential resource limitations for implementing an intervention can alter what are deemed the 511 most effective actions for optimising specific H5N1 influenza control objectives. Likewise, we 512 saw differences in policy recommendations when comparing alternative control objectives to one 513 another. This corroborates previous work that showed establishing the objective to be optimised 514 is pivotal in discerning the management action that should be enacted [17] , whilst underlining 515 the potential pivotal role mathematical modelling has in providing decision support on such 516 matters.
517
A consistent outcome across all combinations of transmission model, capacity constraints and 518 control objectives was the superior performance of proactive schemes, which constantly monitor 519 a predetermined set of premises based on selective criteria, over reactive surveillance schemes 520 (only enforced once an outbreak has begun), ring culling and ring vaccination. Out of the 521 tested proactive schemes, we discerned that monitoring premises with the largest flocks was the 522 most effective approach, with larger coverage levels strengthening performance outcomes. These 523 conclusions are further strengthened by being maintained irrespective of the spatial origin of the 524 outbreak.
525
This may lead us to posit proactive surveillance measures, with flock size based prioritisation, 526 being superior to other control initiatives when applied in other settings. As a note of cau-527 tion, generalising such guidance to alternative circumstances first necessitates gleaning similar 528 outcomes when applying the methodology to other datasets and spatial scenarios. A caveat 529 of our modelling framework is that potential reporting biases between premises have yet to be 530 considered, as a consequence of discrepancies in the enforcement of biosecurity protocols for 531 example. If premises with larger flocks were to have tighter biosecurity protocols, potentially 532 reducing the standard notification delay relative to other premises (i.e. below seven days), this 533 may curtail the performance of population-based surveillance measures. On the other hand, this 534 highlights an alternative application of this particular methodology, where we instead interpret 535 the reduction in the notification delay as capturing an inherent reporting bias linked to a specific 536 14 risk factor (such as flock size). Nevertheless, in the instance of Dhaka division in Bangladesh, 537 we have revealed the potential value attached to establishing systems that ensure premises flock 538 size data are both reliable and frequently updated.
539
Prioritisation schemes linked to flock size would be the most challenging to implement out of 540 those considered in this study, with premises poultry populations fluctuating over time. This 541 is exemplified by the ad hoc approach to collecting commercial poultry premises information 542 via census in Bangladesh, last done in 2010. Nonetheless, such information is theoretically 543 attainable. Expressly for Bangladesh, efforts to monitor commercial poultry flock sizes are 544 facilitated by the 'Animal Diseases Act 2005', requiring all commercial poultry premises to 545 be registered. Presently, listings of premises will be maintained in local administration level 546 systems.
Although not yet contained in a centralised database, efforts are being made by the 547 Bangladesh DLS to fulfil such a plan (M.G. Osmani and M.A. Kalam, personal communication). 548 This would provide a platform with the capability of receiving revised poultry flock sizes with 549 greater regularity.
550
Though putting an active surveillance system into action may face difficulties, typified by the 551 previous active surveillance system in Bangladesh being discontinued in 2013 for monetary rea-552 sons (M.G. Osmani, personal communication), there are other ongoing surveillance schemes 553 within the country demonstrating the capability to carry out policies of this nature. One exam-554 ple is environmental sampling being used to monitor the situation within LBMs [31] . Another 555 is FAO supported trial surveillance programs, comprising villages being surveyed twice a week 556 and deploying rapid detection tests if HPAI viruses are suspected. With the necessary resources, 557 the existence of these ongoing schemes offers a foundation for the introduction of a larger-scale 558 premises-focused surveillance system (M.A. Kalam, personal communication).
559
Surveillance methodology is a discipline requiring greater attention. In the context of early 560 detection of the introduction and spread of H5N1 HPAI viruses, active surveillance does not 561 have to be restricted to only looking for clinical signs of disease within poultry flocks. Sustained 562 swabbing and testing of blood samples on targeted premises may allow near real-time detection 563 of viral infections, thereby further minimising the reporting delay, or even fully eradicating it. 564 Other usages of active surveillance include tracing the likely chain of transmission, overseeing 565 poultry value chains involving different poultry products (i.e. the full range of activities required 566 to bring poultry products to final consumers) to ascertain if there is a particular section of the 567 system where biosecurity is compromised, and monitoring trade and marketing links to track 568 the genetic diversity of circulating strains [32, 33] . Such endeavours will in turn contribute 569 towards the standardisation of sampling, testing, and reporting methods, bolstering full-genome 570 sequencing efforts and encouraging sharing of isolates with the scientific community [34] .
571
Notwithstanding the outcomes relative to active surveillance, our assessment of ring culling and 572 ring vaccination unveiled insights into the suggested ring radii sizes if pursuing these classical 573 intervention methods.
574
For circumstances where transmission is exclusively premises-to-premises, we found consider-575 able variation in the preferred control strategy depending upon the spatial location of the source 576 of the outbreak, the relationship between risk of transmission and between premises distance 577 (examined here by comparing the wave 2 and wave 5 transmission models), and the capacity 578 restrictions that are in place. Although there was a common trend of increasing the suggested 579 radius of an intervention ring zone for less stringent capacity settings, solely culling infected 580 premises was sometimes expected to be the best course of action when both vaccination and 581 ring culling were considered. This is strongly exhibited in the case of reducing the likelihood of 582 a widespread outbreak for an infection with wave 5 type transmission dynamics, with additional 583 ring vaccination deemed ineffective for the majority of district origin locations. In such cases, it 584 may therefore be necessary to consider alternative intervention measures other than vaccination, 585 such as strict movement controls, to further reduce the risk of disease spread. The robustness 586 of these outcomes to alternate vaccine efficacies and the assumptions of effectiveness delay mer-587 its further investigation. Given insight into the exact outbreak circumstances, this shows the 588 potential benefits of having flexibility to adapt the intervention that is ratified 589 Under situations where external factors have a meaningful impact on the transmission dynamics, 590 we found that the class of intervention preferred was highly dependent upon the objective of 591 the control policy. If we are interested in either minimising outbreak duration or the number 592 of infected premises, ring culling is preferred to vaccination. This finding may be a result of 593 the assumptions of a seven day delay from vaccination to immunity and a 70% vaccine efficacy, 594 though qualitative conclusions were unaltered when analysing sensitivity to these vaccine-specific 595 variables. If minimising the number of poultry culled is a priority, then ring vaccination is 596 naturally preferred over ring culling. Furthermore, we observe effects of capacity becoming 597 apparent for vaccination rings of over 4km, as limited capacity interventions applied beyond this 598 rather local scale did not demonstrate additional increases in effectiveness. Situations may arise 599 where ring culling is used in conjunction with this control objective, chiefly when vaccination is 600 not an intervention choice. In these circumstances, one might expect no culling beyond infected 601 premises to be deemed the best action, regardless of the invoked capacity constraints and the 602 underlying transmission dynamics. Nevertheless, highly localised ring culls of 1km were preferred 603 in some instances.
604
It is vital that the area covered by ring based control methods is selected to only be as large as 605 necessary. If set too small then other premises just outside the intervention zone may become 606 infected, which would have been contained had harsher measures been imposed. However, the 607 use of widespread pre-emptive culling based on defined areas around an outbreak has been shown 608 to be very difficult to implement effectively in developing countries. Enforcing wide area culling 609 can alienate farmers if healthy birds are destroyed and the reimbursement through compensation 610 is deemed inadequate or is provided too late. Loss of poultry owner cooperation can be counter-611 productive, leading to resentment and resistance to further control measures [23] .
612
An alternative focal point for control, not explicitly included here, is trade and LBMs. In the 613 event of disease outbreaks among poultry, both farmers and traders face economic losses. In 614 order to reduce such loss they may modify their practices, altering the structure of the trade 615 networks. In turn, these changes may modify the disease transmission dynamics and possibly 616 facilitate additional spread [35] .
617
The high density and variety of avian hosts in LBMs supports the maintenance, amplification 618 and dissemination of avian influenza viruses, whilst providing frequent opportunities for inter-619 species transmission events. In a meta-analysis of before-after studies, to assess the impact of 620 LBM interventions on circulation of avian influenza viruses in LBMs and transmission potential 621 to humans, Offeddu et al. [36] determined that periodic rest days, overnight depopulation and 622 sale bans of certain bird species significantly reduced the circulation of avian influenza viruses 623 in LBMs. Furthermore, prolonged LBM closure reduced bird-to-human transmission risk. De-624 veloping a theoretical model with trade and LBMs included would allow us to validate these 625 findings.
626
The analysis presented here did not consider the role of domestic ducks, due to the low number 627 of poultry premises within the Dhaka division recorded as having ducks present. Nonetheless, 628 at a national level domestic ducks are part of an intricate animal production and movement 629 system, which may contribute to avian influenza persistence [37] . Ducks raised in free-range 630 duck farms in wetland areas have considerable contact with wild migratory birds in production 631 sites, and subsequently with other poultry animals in LBMs. Furthermore, influenza viruses of 632 the H5 subtype typically persist in ducks with very mild or no clinical signs [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] , affecting 633 epidemic duration and spread. If applying this work to other regions of Bangladesh, or scal-634 ing it up to encompass the entire country, domestic ducks warrant inclusion within the model 635 framework.
636
This initial analysis can be extended naturally in a number of additional ways to those already 637 mentioned. While we considered conventional control strategies used to combat avian influenza 638 outbreaks among poultry, namely culling, vaccination and active surveillance, one could compare 639 these traditional schemes with innovative direct interruption strategies that modify the poultry 640 production system [43] . An example would be intermittent government purchase plans, so 641 that farms can be poultry-free for a short time and undergo disinfection. Another is to model 642 restrictions on species composition. This aims to synchronise all flocks on a premises to the same 643 birth-to-market schedule, allowing for disinfection of the premises between flocks. A separate 644 direction for further study is to understand whether the intensification of farming systems, which 645 can alter the demography and spatial configuration of flocks, requires the severity of previously 646 established control protocols to be amended to prevent a small-scale outbreak developing into 647 a widespread epidemic. Such an analysis may be realised by modifying the current model 648 framework to classify premises based on flock size and whether they utilise intensive and extensive 649 methods, with distinct epidemiological parameters for each group.
650
The extent to which other premises prioritisation schemes for administering the intervention of 651 interest influences the results also warrants further examination. For the culling and vaccination 652 controls deliberated here we assumed premises were prioritised by distance, from the outer edge 653 of the designated ring control size inwards. Alternative prioritisation strategies that may be 654 considered, subject to availability of the necessary data, include ordering by flock size (in either 655 ascending or descending order), by between-premises flock movement intensity or prioritising by 656 value chain networks. In the case of active surveillance, rather than a fixed, pre-determined pol-657 icy, extra flexibility can be included by allowing for differing pre-and post-outbreak strategies. 658 Ultimately, public-health decision making generally necessitates the real-time synthesis and eval-659 uation of incoming data. Optimal decision making for management of epidemiological systems 660 is often hampered by considerable uncertainty, with epidemic management practices generally 661 not incorporating real-time information into ongoing decision making in any formal, objective 662 way. An adaptive management approach could be implemented to account for the value of re-663 solving uncertainty via real-time evaluation of alternative models. In addition, this procedure 664 naturally includes economic models embedded within a mathematical framework, allowing for 665 the assessment of control measures to be undertaken in monetary terms [16, 17] .
666
To conclude, through the use of mathematical modelling and simulation, the results of this paper 667 illustrate some general principles of how disease control strategies of H5N1 avian influenza in the 668 Dhaka division of Bangladesh could be prioritised and implemented, accounting for both resource 669 availability and the particular control objective being optimised. Fig. 2 : ECDF for epidemic duration from simulations of the specified transmission model, with the given number of consecutive infection-free days required for an outbreak to be deemed as completed. All simulations used infected premises culling only (no additional controls were in place), with reporting to culling times weighted by the empirical probability mass function. The following ECDFs were constructed using 1,000 simulated realisations: (a) Wave 2, 28 day threshold value; (b) wave 5, 14 day threshold value; (c) wave 5, 28 day threshold value. The threshold values for number of infection-free days signifying the end of an outbreak were subsequently set to 28 days and 14 days for runs with the wave 2 and 5 fitted models respectively.
(a) (b) Fig. 3 : Maps displaying the ring range that optimises minimising epidemic probability with respect to district of outbreak origin and control capacity level, under wave 2 type transmission dynamics. For each combination of control capacity level, district of outbreak origin and control type 1,000 simulation runs were performed. Hatching of a district indicates the preferred strategy was culling infected premises only, while solid shading corresponds to the ring size determined as the optimal severity of response against outbreaks that originally emerged in that district. Lighter shading corresponds to a larger ring culling region. Types of control tested were (a) ring culling, and (b) ring vaccination. For full results see Table S3 .
(a) (b) Fig. 4 : Maps displaying the ring range that optimises minimising epidemic probability with respect to district of outbreak origin and control capacity level, under wave 5 type transmission dynamics. For each combination of intervention method and district of outbreak origin 1,000 simulation runs were performed. Hatching of a district indicates the preferred strategy was culling infected premises only, while solid shading corresponds to the ring size determined as the optimal response against outbreaks that originally emerged in that district. Lighter shading corresponds to a larger intervention region. Types of control tested were (a) ring culling, and (b) ring vaccination. For full results see Table S5 .
(a) (b) Fig. 5 : Maps displaying the preferred active surveillance strategy to optimise control objectives with respect to district of outbreak origin and capacity setting, for outbreaks with wave 2 type transmission dynamics. For each combination of active surveillance method and district of outbreak origin 1,000 simulation runs were performed. District colour corresponds to the active surveillance strategy determined to be optimal for countering outbreaks originating from that district (red -'proactive by population', blue -'proactive by premises density'). In each case the two reactive schemes, 'reactive by distance' and 'reactive by population', were also tested, but neither were ever deemed to be the optimal course of action. Transparency coincides with the reduction in the objective metric relative to the scenario where no active surveillance was utilised, with completely transparent corresponding to a 0% reduction (no improvement) and completely opaque corresponding to a 100% reduction. (a) Minimising average outbreak duration control objective -'proactive by population' scheme was generally preferred, although we found discrepancies in the best scheme dependent upon the control capacity setting. (b) Minimising the probability of an epidemic control objective -'proactive by population' scheme was found to be preferred in all cases when optimising for this aim. For full results see Tables S7 and S8 . Mean number of poultry culled 10 6 Wave 5 -Culling Mean number of poultry culled 10 6 Wave 5 -Vaccination Fig. 7 : Mean number of poultry culled for different ring culling and vaccination radii. The three capacity settings of interest were low (solid blue line, crosses), medium (dashed red line, circles), and high (dotted green line, squares). If pursuing a ring culling strategy, either no culling beyond infected premises or a ring cull of 1km were deemed optimal. For a ring vaccination strategy, a 9km or 10km ring was selected across all capacities. 
Wave 5
No Active Surv. Reactive -Dist. Reactive -Popn. Proactive -Popn. Proactive -Density Fig. 8 : Bar plots comparing the impact of different active surveillance strategies on specific control objectives. For each combination of transmission model, resource restrictions and active surveillance strategy we performed between 500 and 1,000 simulation runs. The control objectives were: (a) predicted probability for outbreak duration t being 90 days or less; (b) predicted probability for outbreak size I not exceeding 25 premises; (c) mean number of poultry culled. For both wave 2 and wave 5 transmission dynamics the 'proactive by population' surveillance strategy was found to be optimal for all control objectives considered, irrespective of the capacity limitations. Full values are given in Tables S11 to S13. Fig. 9 : Cross-intervention performance comparison, relative to only culling infected premises. For each combination of transmission model, capacity-level and control objective, we compared the top performing strategy within each intervention type relative to culling infected premises alone. In each panel, the bar order is as follows: Ring culling (bar one, blue), ring vaccination (bar two, orange), active surveillance (bar three). The control objective comparisons were: (row one) improvement in predicted probability for outbreak duration t being 90 days or less; (row two) improvement in predicted probability for outbreak size I not exceeding 25 premises; (row three) reduction in mean number of poultry culled. Transmission dynamics: (column one) wave 2; (column two) wave 5. For the majority of scenarios, active surveillance was the dominant strategy. 
Proactive surveillance
Low 5% Medium 10% High 25% Shaded cells indicate limit classes that were not applicable under the given type of control strategy.
